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Japan’s Stagnant Nineties: 
A Vector Autoregression Retrospective
RAMANA RAMASWAMY and CHRISTEL RENDU*
This paper uses a vector autoregression (VAR) approach to identify the driving forces
of the growth slowdown in Japan during the 1990s. Negative shocks to both residential
and nonresidential investment are shown to have been important determinants of the
slowdown. Despite the collapse in asset prices, negative shocks to private consumption
were relatively small. A surprising conclusion is that trends in public consumption had
a dampening impact on activity in the nineties. The VAR estimations do not support the
counterfactual conjecture that activity in Japan would have been significantly weaker
in the absence of the expansionary shift in fiscal policy. [JEL: C22, E10, E17, E32]
T
he Japanese economy experienced its worst postwar recession during 1997–98.
The recent decline in activity followed on the heels of a seven-year period in which
the Japanese economy grew at an average rate of just about 11/2 percent a year. The
tepid economic performance of recent years contrasts starkly with the average growth
rate of about 4 percent achieved during the 1980s. Moreover, the prolonged stagnation
of activity in Japan in the 1990s has resulted in the most obvious desynchronization
of the economic cycle among the major industrial countries in the postwar period.
A visible sign of the economic crisis in Japan could be seen in the banking sector.
Moreover, the failure of both equity and land prices to recover from the collapse in
the early 1990s and Moody’s downgrading in November 1998 of Japan’s sovereign
debt in response to the rapidly rising fiscal deficits and public debt have further
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heightened the unease about economic conditions in Japan. While Japan has so far
avoided the high unemployment that would normally be associated with depressed
activity levels of this magnitude, labor market conditions have deteriorated recently,
with marked declines in both employment and job offers. A striking and somewhat
novel aspect of the crisis in Japan can be seen in the limited options currently avail-
able for using traditional macroeconomic policy tools. With the Bank of Japan’s
overnight call rate currently close to zero, minimal further scope exists for providing
support to the economy through a lowering of nominal short-term interest rates.
Moreover, given the recent deterioration in public finances and the rise in long-term
bond yields, the scope for further fiscal stimulus is also seriously limited.
How did Japan get saddled with problems of this magnitude? And what policy
options are available for dealing with them? The focus of recent analyses, perhaps
not surprisingly, has tended to be more on what should be done to get the Japanese
economy back on track than on providing a systematic analysis of what went
wrong. The policy literature falls into three broad groups. One view, associated
prominently with the recent work of Posen (1998) and with some adherents in
international policy circles, argues the case for a substantial fiscal stimulus to
revive the Japanese economy. This viewpoint attributes the relative ineffectiveness
of past fiscal stimulus packages both to the temporary nature of many of the
measures undertaken and to the adoption of programs, such as land purchases,
that have had little impact on activity, rather than to the inappropriateness of fiscal
policy as an effective tool for reviving the economy. 
Krugman (1998) makes the case for the continuing relevance of monetary
policy in Japan, despite an apparent liquidity trap—i.e., the configuration of
nominal interest rates close to zero, mild deflation, and a significant output gap.
However, the liquidity trap implies that monetary policy has to be conducted
primarily through injecting liquidity rather than by targeting an interest rate. Thus,
the Bank of Japan ought to expand the monetary base in a sustained way in order
to increase inflation expectations and lower real interest rates. Krugman down-
plays the importance of solving the banking crisis as a precondition for getting the
Japanese economy moving. According to him, the interplay of adverse selection
and moral hazard would have bad banks lending more, not less.
In contrast, the credit-crunch viewpoint argues that recent reforms in the
banking sector in Japan, such as the implementation of “prompt corrective action”
rules, discourage banks in difficulties from lending indiscriminately. There is
some empirical evidence that lends credence to the hypothesis of activity being
dampened recently by a credit crunch.1
The above discussion suggests no clear consensus has been formed on the
policy measures needed for reviving the Japanese economy. The aim of this paper
is not to make an explicit case for adopting one policy option over another. Instead,
the focus is primarily on providing a systematic analysis of the factors leading up
to the present conundrum in Japan. The reasons for the emphasis on what
happened, rather than on what ought now to be done, are twofold. One follows
1Bayoumi (1998a) uses VAR estimations to provide evidence for the hypothesis that disruptions to
bank lending have played an important role in explaining the recent weaknesses in activity.from the obvious perspective that a better understanding of the recent past should
help in making more reasoned choices among the different policy options. The
other, as observed earlier, is driven by the relative paucity of econometric work on
what went wrong in Japan in the 1990s. While some of the popular writings on
recent developments in Japan have been perceptive, they have had a tendency to be
either discursive or sweeping in their generalizations. It is not easy, for instance, to
test empirically the role played by such structural factors as life-time employment
practices, the nature of financial intermediation, or the pursuit of implicit industrial
policies in dampening growth in the 1990s. It is, however, more tractable to test
econometrically the validity of generally held beliefs regarding the role of macro-
economic factors in inducing the stagnation of output in the 1990s.
This paper uses a vector autoregression (VAR) model, with structural identi-
fying restrictions, to quantify the extent to which the growth slowdown in Japan
during the 1990s was driven by shocks to the different expenditure components of
real GDP. VAR estimations of this type can prove useful in providing techniques
for quantifying existing intuitions about, for instance, whether negative shocks to
private investment were more important than negative shocks to private consump-
tion in dampening activity in the 1990s. Moreover, the results thrown up by such
estimations may motivate the questioning of existing priors, such as whether
developments in international trade did play an important role, and also uncover
new stylized facts that explain the slowdown in activity. Further, as discussed
below, the VAR approach can be useful in providing benchmarks for evaluating the
effectiveness of macroeconomic policies—i.e., for providing a counterfactual
scenario of whether the economy would have been better or worse off in the
absence of the monetary and fiscal policies that were actually pursued.
The main conclusions of this paper are (i) negative shocks to both residential and
nonresidential private investment contributed importantly to the marked deceleration
of output in the nineties; (ii) despite the collapse of both equity and land prices in the
1990s, there has not been a large buildup of negative shocks to private consumption;
(iii) significant negative shocks to public consumption, rather surprisingly, are also
shown to have played a role in dampening activity in the 1990s—an explanation that
figures prominently in the VAR estimations, but one that appears to have been
neglected in most recent analyses of Japan; (iv) despite the strong appreciation of the
yen during the first half of the nineties, the external sector does not appear to have
been a major drag on growth; and (v) the VAR estimations do not provide supporting
evidence for the counterfactual conjecture that activity would have been significantly
weaker in the absence of the expansionary shift in the stance of fiscal policy in the
1990s. The paper suggests intuitive arguments backing each of these findings.
I. VAR Model and Data
A VAR is a multivariate simultaneous equation system, in which each variable under
study is regressed on a finite number of lags of all variables jointly considered. The
VAR approach is useful when the intention is to analyze a phenomenon without
necessarily having any strong priors about competing explanations of it. The method
allows the regularities found in the data to tell the story. However, given that such an
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combine the results coming out of the VAR estimations with explanations of why they
should make intuitive sense. This paper attempts such a juxtaposition in discussing
the types of shocks that the Japanese economy was subject to in the 1990s and draws
conclusions about the effectiveness of the policies pursued during this period.
The VAR model adopted for analyzing economic developments in the 1990s in
Japan focuses on the different components of the national accounts and is sequenced
in two steps.2 The baseline, eight-variable VAR is composed of private consumption,
private nonresidential fixed investment, private residential fixed investment, public
investment, public consumption, exports, imports, and inventories, all measured in
constant 1990 prices. The data are obtained from NIKKEI Telecom and span the
period 1973:Q1 to 1998:Q2.3 Unit root tests (Table 1) indicate that the levels of these
variables are nonstationary. Accordingly, all variables except inventories are intro-
duced in first difference logs.4 Inventories are entered into the model as a ratio of GDP
(and this ratio is stationary). GDP is derived as an auxiliary equation given that it is
the sum of the components in the VAR. The system is estimated with the smallest
number of lags necessary to obtain white-noise residuals in all equations of the system,
whereby the whiteness of the residuals is tested using the Ljung-Box Q statistic. We
find that two lags are sufficient. Using this criterion as a basis for choosing the optimal
lag length makes sense in large systems where parsimony becomes an issue; more-
over, the results were stable when experimented with three and four lags.
The baseline VAR is estimated to obtain an indication of what the innovations
of each of the expenditure equations look like. The estimated residuals Uit (see
appendix for details) of each of the equations of the VAR provides us with a poten-
tial benchmark for judging whether the behavior of a variable in any given period
deviates markedly from the previous history of the system. For instance, when a
large residual is obtained for private consumption, it indicates a change in the
pattern of private consumption expenditure that is explained neither by the past
history of the pattern of private consumption expenditure nor by the history of
changes in the other components of the VAR system.
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2The model is illustrated in the appendix at the end of this paper. The methodology adopted for the
VAR estimations in this paper follows closely the approaches adopted for analyzing the 1990–91 reces-
sion in the United States, by Blanchard (1993), and the 1990–92 recession in the United Kingdom, by
Catão and Ramaswamy (1996).
3Note that the data can also be obtained from the Nomura Research database.
4We further test if the variables are cointegrated. The Johansen rank test reveals the presence of three
cointegrating relationships. Based on this finding the natural modeling strategy would appear to be to esti-
mate a vector error correction mechanism (VECM) with three cointegrating vectors. However, the
problem with this strategy lies in assigning economic meaning to three long-run relationships in a large
system based on purely statistical criteria. Using for example the Johansen or Phillips approach would
hardly be sensible in the context of our structural exercise. We therefore opt for a VAR in first differences
as the more meaningful estimation strategy. Note, moreover, that cointegration is of less importance when
the focus is mainly on isolating shocks and not on parameter estimation. Nevertheless, in order to check
if the estimations carried out using first differences were robust, we estimated a VECM with three coin-
tegrating vectors. The results indicate that the relative magnitude of the shocks to the different compo-
nents of real GDP are very similar to those derived from the VAR in first differences; only the absolute
magnitude of the shocks are smaller when the VECM strategy is implemented. Note that all interpreta-
tions in this paper are based exclusively on the relative magnitude of the shocks.The problem with focusing on the estimated residuals of the VAR system is
that they do not represent the “true” shocks to each of the expenditure compo-
nents. VAR residuals, as is well known, are generally correlated across equations,
because of their joint dependence on common underlying trends and also owing to
the direct contemporaneous dependence of the variables on each other. To get a
measure of the structurally uncorrelated shocks to each of the demand compo-
nents—i.e., to make a reliable judgment about how much the behavior of any
given variable has truly changed in relation to the performance that can be
expected on the basis of past behavior—we need some identifying restrictions.
Two identifying restrictions are used to recover the structural shocks from the
estimated residuals.5 First, it is assumed that within each quarter, the residuals of
the VAR equations are related to each other only through their common depen-
dence on activity. For example, it is assumed that the residuals of the private
consumption equation depend on private fixed investment residuals only through
their common dependence on GDP (common trend). While this assumption is
somewhat restrictive, it is not unduly so, since the feedback effects among these
variables tend to take longer than a quarter to occur. The second identifying
assumption is that public consumption and gross exports are contemporaneously
exogenous, and hence can be used as instruments for GDP.6
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5The two identifying assumptions adopted imply that there are 44 restrictions in total. Note that to
identify the system at least 28 restrictions are needed. See appendix for more details.
6Block exogeneity tests do not reject the hypothesis that both public consumption and exports
Granger cause the rest of macroeconomic system. The estimated chi-square test for the joint exclusion of
public consumption and exports is 30.39, which is significant at the 1 percent level. Moreover, single
equation tests carried out separately for each of the expenditure components are all consistent with the
assumption of the exogeneity of public consumption and exports to the other expenditure components.
Table 1. Unit Root Tests
Variable ADF PP Specification
Private consumption –1.97 –2.32 c, t, 4 lags
Private nonresidential investment –2.03 –1.43 c, t, 2 lags
Private residential investment –2.00 –2.24 c, 4 lags
Exports –3.30 –3.03 c, t, 4 lags
Imports –3.00 –1.78 c, t, 3 lags
Public consumption –1.99 –1.80 c, 2 lags
Public investment –2.16 –1.98 c, t, 1 lag
Inventory ratio –3.98* –6.60** c, t, 2 lags
Real household wealth –0.81 –0.94 c, 2 lags
Fiscal balance ratio –7.54** –0.26 c, t, 3 lags
Real interest rate –2.91** –5.65** 4 lags
Note: ADF and PP tests stand respectively for Augmented Dickey Fuller and Phillips Perron
tests. Specification mentions the best specification possible based on the residual properties (tested
using the Ljung-Box Q statistic). C stands for constant, t for trend. **(*) indicates that the unit root
test is rejected at the 1 percent (5 percent) significance level.By imposing these identifying restrictions on the baseline VAR, we can purge
the residuals of each of the expenditure components of shocks originating from the
other expenditure components. For instance, one way of purging private consump-
tion residuals of shocks originating from the other expenditure components is by
regressing the residuals of the private consumption equation on the residuals of the
auxiliary GDP equation. However, this cannot be accomplished directly given the
simultaneity bias arising from the first identifying restriction. Hence, we use the
estimated residuals of public consumption and exports to create an instrument for
the GDP residuals. In order to be able to make relative comparisons, such as, for
instance, the observation that shocks to private fixed investment in Japan have
been larger than shocks to private consumption in the 1990s, we normalize these
shocks by their respective standard deviations. The impact that the different
shocks have on overall activity will of course be a function of the relative weights
of the respective components of the national accounts system.
II. Results of the Baseline VAR
The results of the baseline VAR, based on the national accounts expenditure vari-
ables, are reported in Table 2. These shocks are computed on the basis of the
procedure outlined above. Each observation in the table represents the cumulative
sum of shocks from the given starting date (and expressed as a ratio of the respec-
tive standard deviations).7 We choose 1990:02 as the benchmark for cumulating
the shocks since it marks the point at which equity prices began to fall in Japan.
Choosing 1991:02, the point at which property prices began to collapse, as an
alternative starting point for cumulating the shocks does not qualitatively change
the results. Since the table reports the cumulative shocks, it should be borne in
mind that a decline, for instance, in the level of the positive shocks from one
quarter to the next should be interpreted as a negative shock in that latter quarter.
And a negative shock simply indicates that the value taken by any variable in a
given period is less than what would be predicted on the basis of the past perfor-
mance of that variable and the past performance of every other variable in the VAR
system.
A notable feature that can be observed from the results of the baseline VAR is
that the cumulative buildup of negative shocks to private consumption in Japan has
been relatively small during the 1990s. The negative shocks to private consump-
tion that do appear in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of equity prices tend
to dissipate toward the end of 1994. The negative shocks reappear in 1996, but are
never very large thereafter.
There is, however, a large buildup of negative shocks to both private residen-
tial fixed investment and private nonresidential fixed investment by the end of
1993; in the case of the latter, they are almost six times larger than the negative
Ramana Ramaswamy and Christel Rendu
264
7We normalize the shocks by the standard deviation of the “own” shocks rather than the standard
deviation of the GDP shocks, as this procedure allows us to make more meaningful comparisons about
the extent to which the deviation of any one expenditure component from past relationships is bigger or
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shocks to private consumption at around this time. The negative shocks to resi-
dential investment tend to persist and become very large by the end of 1997.
While negative shocks to nonresidential investment tend to dissipate from 1995
onwards, this process is never very smooth, and sizable negative shocks reappear
periodically during the interim.
The buildup of positive shocks to the trade balance up until the second quarter
of 1993 reported in Table 2 suggests that the external sector in Japan did not act
as a dampener on activity during this period despite the significant appreciation
of the exchange value of the yen. However, the dissipation of the positive shocks
to the trade balance by end-1995 and the reappearance of mild positive shocks
toward the end of 1997 appear to be consistent with the continued appreciation of
the yen up until mid-1995 and its sharp depreciation thereafter.
There are large positive shocks to public investment in the 1990s. These
correspond in their timing, as can be expected, with the implementation of the
various fiscal stimulus packages that were weighted heavily in favor of public
investment. Table 2 shows a buildup of very large negative shocks to public
consumption by the second half of 1994. These negative shocks persist and
become even larger by the second quarter of 1998. The potential dampening
effects of trends in public consumption on activity in the 1990s have rarely been
discussed in the literature. Are these particular results therefore just a quirk of the
estimation process adopted in the paper, or is there an underlying significance to
the large negative shocks to public consumption? This issue, as well as intuitive
explanations for the observed pattern of shocks to the other expenditure compo-
nents, is discussed below.
The absence of large negative shocks to private consumption does indeed
pose something of a puzzle at first pass. The asset price collapse in Japan during
the 1990s was sizable. Equity prices fell by about 60 percent from their peak
levels by the middle of 1992 and have not recovered significantly since then. And
land prices in the six largest Japanese cities fell by a similar magnitude during the
course of the 1990s. These declines in asset prices in Japan were significantly
greater than those observed, for example, in Sweden and the United Kingdom,
which had themselves experienced sizable declines in asset prices in the early
1990s. Figure 1 illustrates the contrasting experiences among these countries
rather clearly. The private savings ratio in Japan stayed relatively stable following
the collapse in asset prices, whereas this ratio rose by almost 12 percentage points
over the course of two years in Sweden, as private consumption was pruned dras-
tically.
How then does one explain the relatively small negative shocks to private
consumption derived from the VAR estimations? First, households in Japan hold
just about 5 percent of their total financial assets in the form of equities, and
furthermore, the proportion of the listed equities held by the household sector
has been declining ever since the mid-1980s.8 Consequently, the impact of the
boom-bust cycle in equity prices on private consumption in Japan can be
expected to be smaller than in countries where households are significant
8See the various issues of the Annual Securities Statistics of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.JAPAN’S STAGNANT NINETIES
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owners of equity.9 Moreover, Japan did not experience any significant increase
in unemployment until the beginning of 1998. As a result, households in Japan
most likely did not experience the pressing need to increase precautionary
savings normally associated with periods of rising unemployment, as had been
observed in Sweden for example.10 A possible scenario is that, looking ahead,
if unemployment does increase significantly, negative shocks to private
consumption are likely as precautionary factors start coming into play. The
impact of changes in property prices on private consumption will, likewise, also
be a function of the institutional features of the housing market. While home-
owners gain from rising property prices, non-home-owners simultaneously face
potential opportunity costs as possible future owners of property. Home owner-
ship in the six largest Japanese cities is roughly about 50 percent, a much lower
percentage than in countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States.
Consequently, the effects of the boom-bust cycle in property prices on private
consumption is likely to be more muted in Japan than in countries where home
ownership is proportionately larger. Other special features of the housing
market in Japan, such as the asymmetry in the treatment of capital gains and












Source: World Economic Outlook database.
9The impact of wealth effects arising from equity price movements on private consumption has been
estimated to be relatively small even in the case of the United States. See, for instance, the discussions in
Poterba and Samwick (1995), and Staff-McCluer (1998).
10See Carroll (1992) for a detailed discussion of issues pertaining to precautionary savings.
Figure 1. Personal Savings in Selected Countries
(in percent of disposable income)the inheritance tax system, but are taxed heavily in the capital gains tax system),
as well as the very high absolute levels of property prices, tend to render the
housing market particularly illiquid, and dampen potential wealth effects.11
Putting it all together, the relatively small negative shocks to private consump-
tion derived from the VAR are indeed consistent with what could be expected
given the specific institutional features of asset and labor markets in Japan.
The large negative shocks to both private nonresidential fixed investment and
private residential fixed investment fit in rather well with conjectures about the
unwinding, in the 1990s, of the “overinvestment” of the latter half of the 1980s.
The ratio of private gross fixed investment to GDP, for instance, increased by
almost 5 percentage points to reach about 25 percent in 1990. Some of the invest-
ments undertaken during this period, spurred by a combination of rising asset
prices (businesses in Japan own a significant chunk of the listed equities) and the
lax lending policies of banks, were in projects that had low returns and high risks.
Figure 2 provides some stylized facts regarding trends in investment. The ratio of
net business capital to potential output, for instance, increased sharply in relation
to trend between 1987–91; despite the prolonged decline in the rate of private
investment during the 1990s, this ratio is yet to revert fully back to trend
(Figure 2a). An alternative way of evaluating the investment story is in terms of
the dynamic efficiency criterion of Abel, Mankiw, Summers, and Zekhauser
(1989), which compares the relationship between additions to capital and the
returns to it. The narrowing of the gap between capital income and the rate of
investment in the latter half of the 1980s and its subsequent widening following
the decline in the rate of investment in the 1990s are again consistent with the
hypothesis that the cost of the overinvestment (and declining returns to capital) in
the latter half of the 1980s had to be its unwinding in the 1990s (Figure 2b).
As noted earlier, the large negative shocks to public consumption pose some-
thing of a puzzle. However, a closer look at fiscal developments in Japan from a
historical perspective does provide a convincing story consistent with the results
of the VAR estimations. The central government in Japan operated an implicit
“golden rule”––i.e., fiscal deficits to be no higher than the value of public invest-
ment undertaken by the central government––up until 1975.12With the size of the
fiscal deficits growing larger by the end of the 1970s, the central government
abandoned the golden rule and funded deficits with both construction bonds (i.e.,
bonds issued to finance investment projects undertaken by the central govern-
ment), as well as deficit financing bonds (i.e., bonds issued to finance current
expenditures). The golden rule was reinstated once again during the early 1990s,
with only construction bonds being issued in this period. Consequently, there was
an institutional bias in favor of public investment, and against public consump-
tion, in the early 1990s. While deficit financing bonds began to be issued from
1993 onwards, the fiscal stimulus packages during 1993–98 persisted with the
emphasis on public investment. A likely reason for the emphasis placed on public
Ramana Ramaswamy and Christel Rendu
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11For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Ito (1992), and Nishimura, Yamazaki, Idee, and
Watanabe (1998).
12For a more detailed discussion, see Bayoumi (1998b), and Ishi (1996).JAPAN’S STAGNANT NINETIES
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Figure 2. Japan: Business Capital-to-Output Ratio 
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Sources: OECD and NIKKEI telecom.
1Potential GDP is generated using a production function approach.investment in the fiscal packages in Japan is that construction projects can be
used as one-off stimulatory measures. In contrast, once a commitment has been
made to increase public consumption, it is more difficult to reverse it at a later
stage. Thus, when viewed solely as a tool of countercyclical fiscal policy,
spending programs that focus on public investment provide governments with
greater flexibility than ones that place emphasis on public consumption. A trend
that appears to have gone relatively unnoticed in much of recent analyses on
Japan is that, as a consequence of the particular policy choices that were adopted
in the fiscal arena, the average growth of public consumption in the 1990s
declined significantly in relation to its trend growth between 1973–90, whereas
public investment grew on average in the 1990s at about twice the pace of the
previous period (Figure 3). And given that public consumption constitutes
roughly the same share of overall output that public investment does, the impact
of the negative shocks to public consumption is likely to have broadly offset the
positive shocks to public investment in the 1990s.13
III. Policy-Augmented VAR
The baseline VAR provides a useful framework for understanding the precise
manner in which deviations in the pattern of expenditure components from past
trends contributed to the dampening of activity in the 1990s. However, the changes
in the behavior of economic agents during this period did not occur in a vacuum.
Both monetary and fiscal policies were used actively in Japan during the 1990s to
influence the course of economic developments. In the case of monetary policy,
the official discount rate (ODR) was lowered from 6 percent in mid-1991 to about
13/4 percent by end-1993. As activity continued to be weak through 1994, the ODR
was lowered sharply to 1/2 percent by end-1995, a level at which it has remained
since then. The Bank of Japan eased monetary conditions further recently by
lowering its operating target for the overnight call rate to 0.25 percent in
September 1998, and to “as low as possible” in February 1999. In the case of fiscal
policy, there has been at least one major stimulus package every year since 1992,
except in 1997, when fiscal policy turned contractionary with the implementation
of cuts in public works spending and the increase in the consumption tax.
How does one judge whether the monetary and fiscal policies pursued during
this period were successful or not? The fact that economic activity continued to
stagnate in the 1990s is not necessarily an indication of the failure of policies. The
counterfactual scenario could clearly be one in which economic conditions in
Japan would have been even more dismal had the expansionary monetary and
fiscal policies not been undertaken. How then can such a counterfactual hypoth-
esis be verified empirically? The VAR approach has both a limitation and an
advantage for evaluating the counterfactual hypothesis about the effectiveness of
policies. The main limitation is that one is attempting to draw structural inferences
Ramana Ramaswamy and Christel Rendu
270
13The contribution of public consumption to growth in the 1990s was, on average, about half that of
the contribution between 1973–90. In contrast, the contribution of public investment to growth in the
1990s was, on average, twice that of the contribution in the earlier period.from what is, despite the identifying restrictions adopted, essentially a nonstruc-
tural exercise. The advantage of the VAR methodology, however, is that because
of its focus on innovations (or shocks, once recovered from the estimated resid-
uals) it provides a convenient metric for estimating how the shocks would have
evolved once monetary and fiscal policies are incorporated as part of a policy-
augmented VAR.
How can monetary and fiscal policies be proxied in the case of Japan and how
do they enter into the VAR for evaluating the counterfactual scenario? The oper-
ating instrument for monetary policy that has traditionally been used in Japan is
the official discount rate. More recently, the Bank of Japan has used the overnight
call rate as its main monetary policy instrument. The stance of monetary policy
over longer time spans can be captured by using either a smoothed version of the
overnight call rate (as the call rate exhibits volatility on a day-to-day basis owing
to demand shocks for overnight funds), or the three-month CD rate. The time
series properties of these two series are pretty much the same. To capture the
impact of changes in monetary policy on activity, we use a real interest rate,
defined as the three-month CD rate minus consumer price inflation.14
Getting a proxy for fiscal policy turns out to be more complicated in the case
of Japan. Both public investment and public consumption, which have been used
to varying degrees as tools of fiscal policy, are already in the baseline VAR. One
JAPAN’S STAGNANT NINETIES
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Sources: Nikkei Telecom, WEFA, and IMF staff estimates.
14Using the GDP deflator rather than the consumer price inflation to calculate real interest rates does
not make a difference to the results.way of getting an appropriate variable to represent the additional discretionary
fiscal effects in a policy-augmented VAR is to strip out both public investment and
public consumption from the general government balance. To capture the effects
of discretionary fiscal policy, we then take the ratio of the “trend” of the adjusted
general government balance to “trend” GDP.15 (It should be noted that using the
nonadjusted general government balance instead in the estimations does not
change the results of the VAR qualitatively.) The policy-augmented VAR also
incorporates the net worth of the household sector as a ratio of GDP to capture the
impact of potential wealth effects. The monetary, fiscal, and household wealth
variables are entered as exogenous variables in the enlarged system.16
How do we evaluate the counterfactual scenario about the effectiveness of
policies in terms of the pattern of shocks recovered from the policy-augmented
VAR? An intuitive way of trying to make sense of this question is to consider the
hypothetical scenario in which the slump in activity during a given period coin-
cides with the implementation of contractionary monetary and fiscal policies.
Negative shocks derived from a baseline expenditure-based VAR should disap-
pear, or at least decline significantly in the policy-augmented VAR, if the slump in
activity was precipitated by the implementation of these contractionary policies.
In the case of Japan, the scenario being considered is obviously the obverse. The
slump in activity coincides in timing with a significant easing of monetary and
fiscal policies. In order for the counterfactual hypothesis—i.e., that the slump in
activity would have been even more severe in the absence of the expansionary
monetary and fiscal policies pursued—to be true, the negative shocks of the base-
line VAR should become even more negative in the policy-augmented VAR. The
intuition for using this metric as a test of the counterfactual is that, once past rela-
tionships between activity and policies are incorporated into the estimation
process, the deviation of activity from historical relationships in the policy-
augmented VAR should be more severe than it is in the baseline VAR.
Correspondingly, if the shocks recovered from the enlarged VAR do not become
more negative, or in fact become less negative, then these results are consistent
with the hypothesis that the slump in activity would not have been much worse in
the absence of the actual monetary and fiscal policies that were pursued.
Table 3 reports the results from estimations of the policy-augmented VAR.
(The estimations stop in 1997:Q1 because of lags in the availability of data on the
general government’s fiscal balance.) The structural shocks are obtained using the
same identifying restrictions as in the baseline VAR. It can be seen that the shocks
to private consumption in this VAR are not very different from those in the base-
line VAR. The fact that these results are consistent with the hypothesis that poli-
cies had little impact on private consumption during the 1990s should not come as
much of a puzzle. As argued previously, wealth effects in Japan are likely to have
Ramana Ramaswamy and Christel Rendu
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15The “trend” components of both the general government balance and GDP are calculated using the
Hodrick-Prescott filter.
16Block exogeneity tests do not reject the hypothesis that these variables Granger cause the rest of the
system. The estimated chi-square test for the joint exclusion of these variables is 131.48, which is signif-
icant at the 1 percent level. When the policy variables are included as endogenous variables, the results of






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.been small. And banks played only a limited role in extending consumer credit
against collateral to households. Consequently, one would expect the response of
private consumption to changes in monetary policy to be small, as borne out by
the results of the policy-augmented VAR. The apparent failure of fiscal policy to
stimulate private consumption can also be explained. As noted earlier, the fiscal
stimulus packages were weighed heavily in favor of public works projects and
measures to support land purchases. Moreover, the tax reductions incorporated in
the fiscal packages have mostly tended to be temporary in duration, and ad hoc in
conception, a combination that is unlikely to prove effective in stimulating private
consumption.
It can also be seen from Table 3 that the shocks to private residential fixed
investment do not change much up until 1992:Q2 in the policy-augmented VAR
when compared to the baseline estimations, but then become visibly more nega-
tive thereafter. Shocks to private nonresidential fixed investment, in contrast,
become more negative up until 1992:Q2, but then become less negative thereafter.
This would imply that while private residential investment did respond positively
to the fiscal stimulus packages, nonresidential investment did not. The fact that the
shocks to private residential investment get more negative precisely during the
period when the fiscal stimulus packages, with their emphasis on construction
projects, land purchases, and subsidized loans for investments in residential prop-
erty, are implemented in earnest argues in favor of a positive relationship between
the stimulus packages and residential investment. In contrast, one would not
expect, on a priori grounds, a strong relationship to exist between fiscal stimulus
and nonresidential investment, particularly if the negative shocks to private
nonresidential investment partly reflect the necessary unwinding in the 1990s of
the overinvestment in the 1980s. These arguments find support in an experiment
in which the fiscal policy variable is dropped from the enlarged VAR. As can be
seen from Table 4, the shocks to private residential investment revert back to the
levels of the baseline VAR. In contrast, the shocks to private nonresidential invest-
ment become larger, suggesting that while such investment does not respond to
fiscal stimulus, it does to changes in monetary policy.
Thus, while the results of the policy-augmented VAR are consistent with the
conjecture that activity would not have been significantly weaker in the absence of
the discretionary fiscal policies that were actually pursued in the nineties, this does
not necessarily constitute an argument about the ineffectiveness of policies in
general in the Japanese context. It is conceivable that fiscal policy could have been
more successful in stimulating the economy had it been implemented in a less
ad hoc manner and concentrated more on measures that could have had a more
direct and longer-lasting impact on activity.
IV. Conclusion
This paper has provided a framework for identifying the driving forces of the slow
growth in Japan during the 1990s. Large negative shocks to both private residen-
tial investment and private nonresidential investment have been shown to be the
principal factors dampening activity during the 1990s. The negative shocks to
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275private investment essentially reflected the unwinding in the 1990s of the overin-
vestment that took place in the latter half of the 1980s. Negative shocks to public
consumption also contributed to the slowdown of activity. Despite the severe
collapse of asset prices in the nineties, negative shocks to private consumption
proved to be relatively small, reflecting most likely the low ownership of equities
by households and the lack of urgency to increase precautionary savings owing to
the low levels of unemployment in Japan. The external sector did not act as a
major dampener on activity despite the significant appreciation of the yen in the
first half of the 1990s. These VAR estimations do not lend support to the counter-
factual conjecture that activity would have been significantly weaker in the
absence of the expansionary shift in the stance of fiscal policy. The relative inef-
fectiveness of fiscal policy in Japan during the 1990s is likely to be related to the
shortcomings in the design and implementation of the stimulus measures.
Appendix
The VAR Model
The estimated VAR model has the following structure:
(1)
After estimation, Uit is the vector of residuals. GDP is derived as an auxiliary equation
given that it is the sum of the components in the VAR. The GDP residuals are the weighted
average of the residuals to the expenditure components. However, these residuals cannot be
given any structural interpretation, and we need to recover the structural shocks. For this we use
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The identification scheme is based on a simple Keynesian model. It is assumed that each element of
the residual vector is driven by a single common trend (an income trend), and an idiosyncratic
component (the structural shock). Therefore, in the case of private consumption (pc), for instance,
the structural private consumption shock corresponds to the residual ε pc of the following regression:
(2)
Upc is the reduced form residual obtained from the estimation of (1). Note that, due to
simultaneity problems, we cannot use Ugdp directly. Ûgdp is an instrumental variable for Ugdp,
which stands for the fitted values of the following regression:
(3)
where Ugdp, Upuc, and Uc are the reduced form residuals for GDP, public consumption, and
exports estimated from (1).
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